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ABSTRACT
DNS is a vital component for almost every networked application.
Originally it was designed as an unencrypted protocol, making
user security a concern. DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) is the latest pro-
posal to make name resolution more secure.
In this paper we study the current DNS-over-HTTPS ecosystem,
especially the cost of the additional security. We start by surveying
the current DoH landscape by assessing standard compliance and
supported features of public DoH servers. We then compare dif-
ferent transports for secure DNS, to highlight the improvements
DoH makes over its predecessor, DNS-over-TLS (DoT). These im-
provements explain in part the signiﬁcantly larger take-up of DoH
in comparison to DoT.
Finally, we quantify the overhead incurred by the additional lay-
ers of the DoH transport and their impact on web page load times.
We ﬁnd that these overheads only have limited impact on page load
times, suggesting that it is possible to obtain the improved security
of DoH with only marginal performance impact.
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• Networks → Transport protocols; Network measurement;
Network security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Introduced in 1983, the Domain Name System (DNS) has become
a critical component of the Internet. In addition to its original pur-
pose of domain name resolution, DNS has also gained relevance
due to its intensive use by Content Distribution Networks (CDNs)
for traﬃc redirection [5, 8]. Most websites nowadays include con-
tent from third parties, hence requiring multiple DNS queries [7]
to access a single page. To highlight this, Figure 1 shows the num-
ber of DNS queries required to fully retrieve each page in the Alexa
global top 100k sites. Each website was retrieved through Firefox,
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Figure 1: CDF of the number of DNS queries required to re-
trieve all embedded objects for each of the top 100k Alexa
sites.
logging the DNS requests at the stub resolver. Caches of both Fire-
fox and the DNS stub resolver were emptied before requesting the
next website. The ﬁgure illustrates that multiple DNS queries per
page are the norm rather than the exception: about 50% of the sites
require at least 20 DNS queries.
DNS impacts networked application performance [6] and can
reveal information about the destination of a connection [4]. Ad-
dressing increasing concerns about security, DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [11]
and more recently DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [10] have been pro-
posed within the IETF. To increase security, these protocols rely
on a TLS session between the client and the resolver. In the case
of DoH, this TLS session also contains a HTTP connection. So far,
DoT has only gained limited traction, whereas DoH has gathered
substantial momentum already [13], with the help of notable play-
ers like Mozilla, Cloudﬂare and Google.
In this paper, we take a ﬁrst look at the implications of secur-
ing DNS with DoH. We also compare DoT and DoH to shed some
light on why the latter has recently gained so much interest. The
following are the main contributions:
(1) We survey and characterize the current landscape for secure
DNS via HTTP and TLS.
(2) We compare diﬀerent transport protocols for securing DNS
resolution, to understand the momentum behind DoH.
(3) We quantify the overheads incurred by the additional HTTP
and TLS layers in DoH.
(4) We take a ﬁrst look at the impact that switching to DoH
has on web performance, more speciﬁcally DNS resolution
times and page load times.
2 THE DOH LANDSCAPE
To better understand the current landscape of DoH resolvers, we
take the list of DoH servers curated by the curl project,1 and assess
their supported feature set. We initially retrieved all information
1https://github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS
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Provider DoH URL MK
Google (i) https://dns.google.com/resolve G1
Google (ii) https://dns.google.com/dns-query G2
Cloudﬂare https://cloudﬂare-dns.com/dns-query CF
Quad9 https://dns.quad9.net/dns-query Q9
CleanBrowsing https://doh.cleanbrowsing.org/doh/family-ﬁlter CB
PowerDNS https://doh.powerdns.org/ PD
Blahdns https://doh-ch.blahdns.com/dns-query BD
https://doh-jp.blahdns.com/dns-query
https://doh-de.blahdns.com/dns-query
SecureDNS https://doh.securedns.eu/dns-query SD
Rubyﬁsh https://dns.rubyﬁsh.cn/dns-query RF
Commons Host https://commons.host/ CH
Table 1: ComparedDoH resolvers.Markers (MK) refer to col-
umn identiﬁers used in Table 2. Blahdns oﬀers DoH services
on three diﬀerent URLs.
in this section on 10 October 2018. We then veriﬁed it and, where
necessary, updated entries in both tables again on 10 September
2019.
As Table 1 shows, major players like Google, Cloudﬂare and
IBM (Quad9), as well as some smaller players, support DoH.We ob-
serve diversity in their service conﬁgurations. While diﬀerent base
URLs for every service can be expected, it is surprising to see four
diﬀerent URL paths (/, /resolve, /dns-query, /family-filter)
just among these nine providers. Google even uses diﬀerent paths
to two diﬀerent services with the same base URL. While techni-
cally the DoH RFC [10] does not mandate a speciﬁc path to be
used and leaves it up to the service operators, the majority of ser-
vices still use the path /dns-query, which is the one used in all
examples in the RFC. Given the huge eﬀorts spent by operators to
obtain easy-to-remember and thus easy-to-conﬁgure IP addresses
for their UDP based DNS servers [12, 24], seeing such a poten-
tially confusing variety and choices for the DoH service param-
eters is noteworthy. DoH operators indeed seem to have realised
this, when we ﬁrst collected this information in October 2018 we
observed six diﬀerent base paths for the same set of providers,
while now we only observe four.
We now examine the features supported by the individual re-
solvers. HTTP supports the transmission of diﬀerent content types.
As per the DoH RFC, all DoH servers and clients must support
the application/dns-message content type, which essentially is
an encapsulation of the UDP DNS wireformat in HTTPS. Another
widely supported type is application/dns-json which represents
DNS messages in JSON format. While a draft RFC for the JSON
DNS format [3] exists, its support is notmandatory forDoH servers.
The application/dns-message content type is supported by all
implementations except Google’s. Google in fact operates two dif-
ferent services with two diﬀerent paths (/resolve and /dns-query)
on the same domain, with each service only supporting one con-
tent type. Curiously enough, the service supporting the RFC man-
dated format was initially named /experimental and has since
Feature G1 G2 CF Q9 CB PD BD SD RF CH
dns-message ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
dns-json ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
TLS 1.0 ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
TLS 1.1 ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
TLS 1.2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
TLS 1.3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
CT ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
DNS CAA ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
OCSP MS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
QUIC ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
DNS-over-TLS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Traf. Steering DL* DL* AC+ AC+ AC+ UCÂś UCÂś UCÂś UCÂś AC+
* DNS Load Balancing + Anycast Âś Unicast
Table 2: Comparison of DoH resolver features. Column
names refer to markers in Table 1.
then being renamed to /dns-query. This again highlights that op-
erators have understood that too many diﬀerent URLs are confus-
ing and might lead to conﬁguration errors. Of the remaining eight
providers four also support the JSON format on the same path as
the DNS wireformat.
DoH was designed as a secure service with transport encryp-
tion via TLS. TLS support is thus a strict requirement. There has
been signiﬁcant change on the TLS front recently, with TLS 1.3 be-
coming an oﬃcial RFC and security vulnerabilities POODLE and
BEAST rendering TLS 1.0 and lower standards insecure. All DoH
servers support TLS 1.2, and seven of the nine providers also sup-
port TLS 1.3. This is a positive sign towards broader acceptance of
DoH, since when we assessed these features in October 2018 only
Cloudﬂare and SecureDNS supported TLS 1.3. On the other hand,
we also see that some servers still support the deprecated TLS ver-
sions 1.0 and 1.1. We suspect the reason is that some operators
are concerned about compatibility issues with older client libraries
and thus also support older TLS versions. While the client can al-
ways insist on negotiating a connection with TLS 1.2 or higher, it
would make sense that operators also use this opportunity to pro-
vide secure DNS and simultaneously put pressure on dropping TLS
versions 1.1 or lower.
Four of the servers surveyed (Google, Cloudﬂare, IBM, and Pow-
erDNS) also support DNS-over-TLS [11], the previous RFC for en-
cryptingDNS requests using TLS. Despite having a three-year head-
start over DoH, DoT has failed to gain signiﬁcant traction com-
pared to the previous speciﬁcation. We will further explore both
protocols in the next section.
Finally, DNS-over-HTTPS relies on the PKI-certiﬁcate system to
ascertain the identity of the DNS resolver. To compensate known
weaknesses and ﬂaws of this system, techniques such as Certiﬁcate
Transparency (CT)2, CertiﬁcationAuthorityAuthorization (CAA) [9]
records and Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) [22] have
been proposed.We check for support of CT, DNS CAA records and
2https://www.certiﬁcate-transparency.org
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Figure 2: Impact of head-of-line-blocking on resolution times for DNS over diﬀerent transport protocols. The upper charts
depict the baseline and the lower ones the eﬀect of a delay (1000ms for one in 25 queries).
OCSP in the Must-Staple (MS) conﬁguration. While all certiﬁcates
used for the DoH-servers are registered in the CT system, only
Google oﬀers DNS CAA records and no server demands OCSP MS.
Again, we argue that the introduction of a new secure DNS proto-
col would be an ideal opportunity to establish and require support
for all techniques that can further improve the security of DoH.
3 TRANSPORTS FOR SECURE DNS
In this section, we investigate the impact of diﬀerent (secure) trans-
port choices for DNS messages. We compare DNS-over-TLS with
DoH using both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2.0.3
We compare the eﬀect of these diﬀerent choices of transport via
a controlled experiment. We set up a local CoreDNS resolver, and
use it to resolve 100 domain names via UDP, TLS, HTTP/1.1 and
HTTP/2.0. As we are evaluating the impact of the transport proto-
col, we instruct our resolver to always return the same IP address
independently of the domain name. Using unique domain names
for each query rules out any impact of cachingwhile still being able
to attribute diﬀerences in resolution time to the transport protocol
instead of the resolved domain name. We construct the queried do-
main names with a random preﬁx of constant length ﬁve followed
by a ﬁxed base domain. This construction ensures that eﬀects of
compression of query names are uniformly distributed across all
queries, hence ensuring that diﬀerences in compressability of do-
main names do not impact our results. To introduce workload vari-
ability, we use non-deterministic query arrival time, where query
arrival times follow a Poisson distribution with an average arrival
rate of 10 queries per second. Experiments were carried out on a
machine running CentOS 7 on a 4-core Intel Core i5-2500K CPU
(3.30 GHz) and 8GB of RAM. Python 3.6 and CoreDNS 1.2.2 were
used. Experiments were isolated with Docker containers. Python’s
standard packages for sockets, TLS and HTTP/1.1 were used, DNS
handling was donewith the dnspython package, for HTTP/2.0 sup-
port Facebook’s doh-proxy package was used.
3We do not consider DNScrypt here since it takes an orthogonal approach. Whereas
DoT and DoH encapsulate the original DNS UDP wireformat with TLS and HTTP
headers respectively, DNScrypt uses a redesigned wireformat combining all these fea-
tures into a single message.
We carry out two measurement runs. In the ﬁrst run, we obtain
a baseline of the achievable performance by answering queries as
fast as possible. We then instruct our resolver to delay one in every
25 queries by 1000ms, to observe whether delays in resolution time
aﬀect subsequent answers.
Figure 2 provides the results in both scenarios for each transport
protocol. Resolution time is the time it takes the application to re-
ceive and fully parse a reply, not just the time it takes the network
to transmit the message. The upper row shows baseline perfor-
mance without delay. The second row shows per query resolution
times with the introduced delay. The HTTP/1.1 scenario employs
HTTP request pipelining, as we are assessing the resilience against
slow or delayed queries of the individual transports (so HTTP/1.1
without pipelining would be an unfair comparison).
For the baseline case without delay, we observe that both UDP
and TLS deliver responses to queries in less than one millisecond.
These values are expected for a controlled experiment setup run-
ning on the localhost.4 HTTP/2.0 consistently delivers results in
less than ten milliseconds. Only for HTTP/1.1, the baseline perfor-
mance ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly, which we attribute to issues in the
pipelining support.Mostmajor browsers tried to supportHTTP/1.1
pipelining, but have ceased to support it due to too many interop-
erability issues negatively aﬀecting performance [16, 21].
In the bottom row experiments, we observe that DNS via UDP
is hardly aﬀected by the delay. We clearly see four outliers for the
four delayed queries, without any visible impact on subsequent
queries. Indeed, DNS via UDP can utilize diﬀerent connections via
multiple port numbers to eﬀectively multiplex queries and thus
make them independent.
For TLS as transport protocol, we see that the delayed queries
have a knock-on eﬀect on subsequent queries; the serialization of
the TLS connection implies that a reply to a subsequent query is
only sent after the reply to the delayed query. Out-of-order deliv-
ery of replies via TLS is also possible since every request/reply
pair can be identiﬁed by their unique ID. The DNS-over-TLS (DoT)
RFC states that this feature should be supported, although it is
4The ﬁrst query is slower than the following ones due to additional packet round-trips
by TCP and TLS handshakes during connection setup.
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Figure 3: Total bytes per resolution. Domain names were re-
solved via UDP-DNS (U), DNS-over-HTTPS without persis-
tent connection (H) and with a persistent connection (HP).
The DNS servers of Cloudﬂare (CF) and Google (GO) were
used. Whiskers span the full range of values.
not mandatory. In practice, out-of-order delivery greatly compli-
cates the server implementation compared to standard UDP, as it
requires state management on the server side to handle these re-
quests. From the only three existing DoT servers in the wild (as per
Wikipedia at the time of writing this paper), we have veriﬁed that
only Cloudﬂare supports out-of-order delivery. Implementing out-
of-order delivery via TLS is akin to (re-)implementing the stream
multiplexing part of SCTP, QUIC or HTTP/2.0. We believe that
this is one of the main reasons why DoT failed to gain signiﬁcant
traction. Surprisingly, we are not aware of any other work explic-
itly demonstrating the potential performance impact of simple TLS
transport on DNS.
For HTTP/1.1,we observe similar knock-on eﬀects as for TLS. In
the case of HTTP/1.1, there is no way to circumvent these as the in-
order-delivery of requests is demanded by the RFC [18]. It is only
when we turn to HTTP/2.0 that we observe a similar insensitivity
to delayed queries as with UDP. Indeed, the DoH RFC states that
HTTP/2.0 is the minimum recommended version of HTTP to be
used.
In this section we have seen that DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-
HTTPS/1 suﬀer from head-of-line-blocking. Only with HTTP/2.0
DoH manages to provide similar results to UDP DNS with respect
to head-of-line blocking. This diﬀerence in behavior might (at least
in part) explain why it was easier for DNS-over-HTTPS/2.0 to gain
traction than for DNS-over-TLS.
4 OVERHEAD
In the previous section, we have seen that DNS-over-HTTPS/2
oﬀers signiﬁcant advantages over DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-
HTTPS/1. However, the requirement for HTTP/2 introduces addi-
tional layers and thus more headers and overhead. In this section,
we compare the overhead incurred byDNS-over-HTTPS/2 and reg-
ular UDP-based DNS.
To obtain a set of domain names that is representative of the real-
world, we fetch the top 100,000 webpages as per global Alexa rank-
ing and gather all domains that were resolved during these fetches.
We instruct the local stub resolver to log all queries. The Alexa
list was retrieved on 15 September 2018. In contrast to browser-
generated HTTP Archive (HAR) ﬁles, this allows us to obtain the
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Figure 4: Total packets per resolution. Domain names were
resolved via UDP-DNS (U), DNS-over-HTTPSwithout persis-
tent connection (H) and with a persistent connection (HP).
The DNS servers of Cloudﬂare (CF) and Google (GO) were
used. Whiskers span the full range of values.
domains that are not part of the actual webpage but are contacted
by commonweb browsers during page load, e.g., OCSP records for
secure TLS connection establishment.While fetching these 100,000
webpages, 2,178,235 DNS queries were sent. As domain names can
be embedded in more than one page, these 100,000 page fetches
resolved 281,414 unique domain names. Notably, almost 25% of
all DNS queries can be attributed to the ﬁfteen most frequently
queried domain names. We then resolve these domain names from
a university vantage point via regular UDP-based DNS and DNS-
over-HTTPS, using the respective resolvers of both Google and
Cloudﬂare.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of request sizes for all six sce-
narios. Figure 4 depicts the number of packets. When comparing
UDP-based DNS with DoH, we see that the UDP transport system-
atically leads to fewer bytes and fewer packets exchanged, with
the median DNS exchange consuming only 182 bytes bytes and 2
packets. A single DoH resolution in the median case on the other
hand requires 5737 bytes and 27 packets to be sent for Cloudﬂare
and 6941 bytes and 31 packets for Google. A single DoH exchange
thus consumes more than 30 times as many bytes and roughly 15
times as many packets than in the UDP case. Persistent connec-
tions allow to amortize one-oﬀ overheads over many requests sent.
In this case, the median Cloudﬂare resolution consumes 864 bytes
in 8 packets, the median Google resolution 1203 bytes in 11 pack-
ets. While this is signiﬁcantly smaller compared to the case of a
non-persistent connection, DoH resolution still consumes roughly
more than four times as many bytes and packets than UDP-based
DNS does.
While in the legacy case there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence, in the
DoH case Google’s server leads to larger transactions than Cloud-
ﬂare’s. This is caused by Google needing more bytes to establish
and maintain the TLS connection than Cloudﬂare. The reason is
Google’s usage of a certiﬁcate larger than Cloudﬂare’s: in our spe-
ciﬁc setup, Cloudﬂare transmits two certiﬁcates worth 1,960 bytes
and Google transmits two certiﬁcates worth 3,101 bytes. When us-
ing a persistent TLS connection, the overheads get amortized over
the many requests made.
We now break down the overhead for DoH. As a by-product,
we showcase some of the new features of HTTP/2 in compari-
son to HTTP/1. Next to header compression using HPACK [20],
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Figure 5: Overheads per DNS resolution for DNS-over-HTTPS/2. First two columns show sizes for (HTTP) bodies and headers
exchanged. Mgmt refers to messages being exchanged to maintain the HTTP/2 connection like settings and windows updates.
TLS and TCP refer to sizes of the respective layers.
HTTP/2 also supports a diﬀerential transmission mechanism that
only transmits the changed headers during the subsequent exchanges.
HTTP/2 also deﬁnes new message frames to manage the connec-
tion. Figure 5 shows a breakdown of overheads into individual lay-
ers and protocols. Across all four cases, the distribution of body
sizes is similar, albeit Google tends to send slightly larger bodies
in the extreme case.
Every additional layer of complexity adds overhead that is at
least the same size as the original DNS payload. Notably, even the
overhead incurred by TLS encryption and TCP headers and addi-
tional messages is already of the size of the complete DNS payload.
Regarding the HTTP/2 overhead (headers and mgmt), we see that
using a persistent connection leads to less data being exchanged.
For the headers, this is caused by HTTP/2’s diﬀerential headers
feature, which in sequential requests and replies only transmits
those headers that have changed. The management messages are
required to manage the HTTP/2 connection and multiplexing of
diﬀerent streams. They do not need to be sent for every single
client-server-interaction. Therefore, when using a persistent and
thus re-usable connection, the amount of management bytes sent
per request-response-cycle is smaller in comparison to non-persistent
connections. For the overhead incurred by TLS, for the non-persistent
connections, the overhead is dominated by the server certiﬁcate as
discussed above. In the case of persistent connections, the upper
whiskers in Figure 5 are caused by the (at least once) necessary
certiﬁcate exchange. The median values however are signiﬁcantly
lower as an established connection is re-used many times. This
variability in the TLS overhead also causes diﬀerent overheads at
the TCP and outer layers, as the higher number of bytes transmit-
ted for the TLS layer also leads to more packets.
In summary, many of the one-time overheads required for TCP,
TLS and HTTP connection setup and management can be amor-
tized if a persistent connection is used. However, even in this case,
the median overhead caused by the TLS and TCP layer are each
already of the size of the actual DNS message. For DNS resolution
over HTTP, this eﬀect is pronounced because of the comparably
small size of the DNS message. When considering transmitting
web pages via HTTPS, this eﬀect will be less pronounced in com-
parison to DNS messages, given the larger size of websites.
5 DOH PERFORMANCE
In the previous sections we have quantiﬁed the potential impact of
head-of-line-blocking as well as the additional overheads of DoH.
In this section, we assess whether DoH impacts performance, more
speciﬁcally we look at a web browsing scenario and investigate
how a change to DoH aﬀects page loading times.
We use the Firefox web browser to measure webpage load times
for the 1,000 highest ranked webpages in the global Alexa ranking.
The Alexa list was retrieved on 18 April 2019. We choose Firefox
because as of the time of writing this paper it was the only browser
with documented support for DoH. We use Firefox 66.0.3 for the
experiments. We rely on the Browsertime framework from the site-
speed.io project5 to instruct Firefox for the measurements and col-
lect HAR ﬁles with the performance statistics.
We measure performance using the locally conﬁgured resolver,
and also using the public resolvers from Google and Cloudﬂare
over legacy DNS as well as DoH. This way, the performance ob-
tained with the local resolver provides a baseline, allowing us to as-
sess how a change to a cloud-provided DNS service aﬀects perfor-
mance. For the cloud provided DNS services, we also assess the per-
formance diﬀerence between using the traditional UDP-based DNS
protocol and DNS-over-HTTPS. In this setup, each website was
loaded three times with the browser cache purged before eachmea-
surement iteration. This was done from a university-local server.
The left plot in Figure 6 shows the CDFs of the cumulative DNS
resolution times per webpage in milliseconds. By cumulative DNS
resolution times, we mean the time it would take to perform all
DNS queries serially, whereas in reality they can be parallelised.
We crop the CDF plot at 20,000ms, since the results have a very
long tail.
We ﬁrst observe that the cloud-based name resolution via UDP
leads to faster resolution times than using the local resolver. From
the cloud-based ones, Cloudﬂare leads to faster resolution times
than Google. When comparing DoH-services from Cloudﬂare and
Google, we observe that using DoH leads to longer DNS resolution
times than when using the traditional DNS resolution. This is to
be expected from the added overhead for encryption and transport.
Also, we observe that the DoH resolution provides comparable res-
olution times to the local resolver, with again Cloudﬂare slightly
faster than Google.
5https://www.sitespeed.io
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Figure 6: CDF of DNS resolution and page load times (time of onload event): U/ indicates legacy resolver,H/ indicates resolution
via DoH, /LO indicates local resolver, /GO indicates Google and /CF indicates Cloudﬂare.
Even though these results show that changing to DNS resolu-
tion via DoH leads to longer DNS resolution times, this does not
necessarily translate into longer page load times. The second plot
in Figure 6 shows CDFs of the complete page load time, measured
as the time when the onload event was triggered. The onload event
is triggeredwhen thewhole page including all dependent resources
like stylesheets and images has been loaded [17]. Note that overall
page load times are faster thanDNS resolution times as the browser
sends requests in parallel, whereas DNS plots shows cumulative
DNS resolution times without parallelism. The ﬁgure shows that
page load times are comparable for all resolution approaches. As
for the previous DNS resolution times, using a cloud-based DNS
service oﬀers slightly faster page load times. There is however lit-
tle diﬀerence between page load time via legacy DNS or DNS-over-
HTTPS: both resolutionmechanisms achieve similar page load times.
Note that we also attempted to run the same experiments from
PlanetLab. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this paper, only 39
nodeswere able to run these experiments, as most of themwere un-
reachable, and among those that were reachable, many were run-
ning an OS that was too old to support a recent enough version of
Firefox that supports DoH. The limited results (plots on the right
in Figure 6) we obtained from PlanetLab however are consistent
with those we have obtained locally: DNS resolution via DoH takes
longer, but page load times overall change only little when chang-
ing the resolution method.
Overall, the results of this section show that a switch to DNS-
over-HTTPS does not seem to incur signiﬁcantly longer page load-
ing times. This means it is feasible to beneﬁt from the better pri-
vacy guarantees of DoH without sacriﬁcing user-perceived page
loading times.
6 RELATED WORK
DNS-over-HTTPS still is a relatively new protocol. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to look into the diﬀerences
between DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-TLS and UDP-based DNS.
Mozilla has published a blog post [15] brieﬂy describing their expe-
rience with a DoH trial in Firefox. This blog post however focuses
more on reporting experiences of using a third-party resolver than
on implications that stem directly from using DoH, especially the
transport aspect. In a blog post [13], Geoﬀ Huston also asks for
the advantage of DoH over DoT. This post discusses application
features like HTTP push and namespaces, but does not discuss in-
sensibility against slow queries as we do.
Since the inception ofDNS, the Internet has evolved and changed,
exposing the DNS protocol to new threats and challenges. The un-
encrypted transport of DNS leads to security and censorship is-
sues [4, 14], whereas using UDP makes DNS usable for distributed
denial-of-service attacks [2]. Other works have proposed protocol
changes to use persistent connections and encryption [26]. These
works list and discuss issues with the traditional UDP-based trans-
port for DNS, of which most can be addressed by using DNS-over-
HTTPS instead. In that sense, they provide good arguments to
change to DoH, but do not discuss details of DoH directly.
Content delivery networks often use DNS to perform their traf-
ﬁc redirection. It is an active research area, with works aiming at
better understanding these redirection strategies [5, 8, 19]. Other
works study DNS resolver behavior in the wild with respect to
latency and traﬃc redirection [1], look at the impact of DNS on
overall application delays in the Internet [6, 25] or look at DNS
infrastructure provisioning at the client side [23]. While all these
works also target DNS, they have a stronger focus on the actual
applications of DNS than the protocol itself.
7 CONCLUSION
DNS is one of the most important protocols for many networked
applications today and was originally designed as an unencrypted
protocol. Growing concerns about user privacy have led to pro-
pose more secure approaches. In this paper, we have surveyed the
current DoH landscape. We have exposed the diversity in the sup-
ported content types, in the support for DNS-over-TLS, and in the
supportedTLS versions. We have seen, thatwhilemost DoH servers
support a good set of security parameters, many of them still do
support deprecated legacy settings. We have then studied the be-
havior of DoT andDoH against delayed queries, showing thatHTTP/2
oﬀers advantages over HTTP/1 and DNS-over-TLS. In the process,
we have exposed the likely reasonwhyDoThas not gained traction
compared to DoH, despite having had a head start of a few years
before DoH. We have then quantiﬁed the overheads incurred by
the HTTP and TLS layers of HTTP/2. Finally, we have measured
how DoH impacts page load times. This has shown that it is pos-
sible to obtain the additional security of DoH with only marginal
performance penalties.
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